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rnest Gellner’s enduring definition of nationalism – that it is «a political 
principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be 
congruent» – though admirable for its terse precision, fails to capture a 
most significant and contentious aspect of nationalism and the state-
building projects in which it is implicated, namely that nations and political units must 
ultimately reside in a specific geographic space1. Carving out these national spaces has 
been and remains a leitmotif of modern history generating a raison d’être for most 
revolutions and a casus belli for sundry wars across the globe. If there is a modern 
political imaginary, a recent episteme that divides the current political culture from its 
premodern antecedents, it is the national imaginary, which links nation and political 
                                                 
1 GELLNER, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 1. 
E 
Diacronie 
Studi di Storia Contemporanea  www.diacronie.it 
N. 23 | 3|2015 Mediterraneo cosmopolita: le relazioni culturali tra Turchia ed Europa 
1/ 
Reimagining Mediterranean Spaces: Libya 
and the Italo-Turkish War, 1911-1912 
Jonathan McCOLLUM * 
 
The Italo-Turkish War, a struggle over the territory that the Italian occupiers later re-
christened as Libya, became a heated ideological battleground for the emerging 
nationalisms of the Mediterranean. This paper delineates the contours of the 
geographical imaginaries of Italian and Ottoman imperial nationalisms and how 
participants and pundits of the conflict incorporated Libya into their national spaces. 
Examining the writings and publications of influential nationalist leaders Enrico 
Corradini and Enver Pasha, it compares the idealization of territory and the material 
limits of national imaginaries in response to European colonialism, the hardening of 
borders, and the emergence of a world system of nation-states. 
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unit to a given territory2. James Gelvin labels this diffuse social imaginary a ‘culture of 
nationalism’ and lists amongst its primary tenets the assumption that «nations enjoy a 
special relationship with a particular territory that is the repository for that nation’s 
history and memory»3. It is on the geographic plane that nationalisms are legitimized 
and become the accepted building bloc of the modern world: the nation-state. The 
ideological and the physical thus intersect on the soil claimed by nations, and the 
activities of defending, conquering, defining, and migrating to and from imagined 
national spaces are the sine qua non of modern history. 
Stressing that conflicts over territory are the sites in which nationalist ideologies 
meet their material limitations, in the following pages I set out to recover two failed 
imperial nationalisms: Italian colonialism and Ottomanism. Pairing these two together 
may appear at first unexpected because the Italian state and its nationalism persist 
whereas Mustafa Kemal’s Republic of Turkey stamped out the last vestiges of an 
Ottoman state in the early 1920s; however, the Ottoman and Italian imperial fates are 
entwined, and the contemporaneous unraveling of the Ottomans’ Mediterranean 
empire and the rise of a short-lived Italian hegemony in the same spaces provide a 
glimpse at the contingency of two competing national imaginaries that collided in the 
central Mediterranean corridor4. Italy’s first national war, fought precisely a half-
century after its unification, was a colonial effort to wrest the territory of what is now 
Libya from the Ottoman state and was of central import to the construction of Italian 
nationhood5. And yet, the Italian imperial designs for the territory to be its quarta 
sponda (fourth shore) and the geographical and imperial imaginaries that accompanied 
it foundered a few decades after its victory in the Italo-Turkish War (1911-1912). 
Likewise, an Ottoman imperial nationalism with its own attendant geographical and 
demographic imaginaries followed its soldiers into the field and provided the principles 
by which its officers understood and implemented their defense against their Italian 
opponents. 
This essay, thus, employs the territory of Libya as a heuristic device to scrutinize 
two distinct imperial nationalisms and the ways in which they incorporated geographic 
spaces into their national syntax. The integration of Libya into these national and 
                                                 
2 HOBSBAWM, Eric, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 14. Hobsbawm contends that «[t]he basic 
characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its modernity». 
3 GELVIN, James, «Pensee 1: “Arab Nationalism” Meets Social Theory», in International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, 41, 2009, p. 11. 
4 CLANCY-SMITH, Julia, Mediteraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, 
circa 1800-1900, Berkeley-Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2012, p. 198. 
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imperial lexicons points towards a reevaluation of the relationship between empire and 
nation. Nationalism has either been perceived as the death knell of the ‘old empires’ or 
as inherently antithetical to imperialism. As the modern colonial empires of Europe 
acquired possessions overseas they carried with them the seeds of their own 
destruction, transplanting a culture of nationalism into their newly acquired territories. 
However, such views tend to disregard the fungible and protean capacities of national 
identity. This paper thus follows a more recent vein of scholarship on empire that 
stresses the more ambivalent and elastic relationship between empire and nation6. For 
Italians, empire and nation overlapped as expansion in the Mediterranean could 
provide the means of recapturing its emigrant nation7. The nation, perceived as loosing 
its lifeblood through emigration, could only be cured from this hemorrhaging through a 
settler-colonial expansion into North Africa. For the Ottomans, however, it was not 
migration but alliance and conversion to Ottomanism that could save its 
nation/empire. 
Seeing these two modalities of nationalism emerging from a dialectic charged by the 
conflict over the imperial space of Libya, I take up an examination of two prominent 
nationalist actors whose efforts manifest the material conditioning of their ideologies 
and the imperial designs of their nationalist thought. First, on the Italian side, I 
investigate the political activism of Enrico Corradini, the founder of the most successful 
Post-Risorgimento nationalist movement in Italy. One of the most vociferous advocates 
for the Italian seizure of Libya, his name became synonymous with Italian 
nationalism8. Second, from the Ottoman camp, I proceed with an investigation not of 
an ideologue nor a political activist, but of a military officer Enver Bey, the future Enver 
Pasha, a commander of the Ottoman forces in Cyrenaica for the duration of the conflict. 
An early member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a participant in the 
1908 ‘Young Turk Revolution’, and a commander in the suppression of the countercoup 
of 1909, Enver Bey had already risen to distinction prior to his deployment in Libya to 
organize resistance to the Italian invasion. While historians have long considered the 
CUP a crypto-Turkish nationalist society, more recent studies have questioned its 
supposedly Turco-centric arrogance and shown its allegiance to a more inclusive 
                                                 
6 See LAWRENCE, Adria, Imperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2013; SHIELDS, Sarah, Fezzes in the River: Identity Politics and European 
Diplomacy in the Middle East on the Eve of World War II, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2011. 
7 CHOATE, Mark, Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard 
University Press, 2008. 
8 CUNSOLO, Ronald, Enrico Corradini and Italian Nationalism, Ph.D. diss., New York 
University, 1962. 
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project of Ottomanization rather than an adherence to an exclusionary policy of 
Turkification9. As a leading member of the CUP Enver Bey embodies a current in 
Ottoman nationalist politics that shifted course not by dint of intellectual ambivalence 
but on account of changing circumstances. In many ways the careers of Enver Pasha 
and Enrico Corradini mirror one another – both were ebullient nationalist leaders 
whose relevance dissipated soon after the First World War as Mustafa Kemal’s Turkish 
nationalism and Benito Mussolini’s Fascism supplanted their respective movements. 
Examining these two leaders in parallel has the potential to magnify the ways in which 
these two nationalisms converged in their designs for the territory of Libya. Further, 
the differences between their geographical imaginaries of empire will bring into sharp 
relief the consequences of ideology for the territory’s inhabitants. 
While this essay selects these strains of nationalism for investigation, I do not 
consider these the only significant contestants in the constellation of nationalisms in 
play at this period. Certainly, the Italo-Turkish War and the subsequent colonial war of 
occupation was of considerable import for Arab and later Libyan nationalists, amongst 
others the young Egyptian nationalist Abd al-Rahman Azzam Bey, the first secretary 
general of the Arab League, journeyed to the territory to join in the fray10. Furthermore, 
by taking up the Italo-Turkish War (1911-1912) as my subject of inquiry, my approach 
truncates the periodization of this conflict. If this essay were concerned more with the 
development of either Arab or Italian nationalisms over the course of the longer war for 
occupation, the Italian war for Libya (1911-1931) would be a more appropriate 
appellation for this struggle11. My point is therefore not to delineate the variety of 
competing nationalisms but to expose how two imperial nationalist currents 
intersected in North Africa. It is their particular articulation with the territory of Libya 
and the geographical imaginaries they produced that concern me. 
 
2. The Geographical Imaginaries of Libya 
 
It is, of course, an anachronism to refer to the geographic space in which the nation-
state of Libya persists to this day (who knows if it will continue) as ‘Libya’. For the 
Ottomans of 1911, the territory was divided into three parts: Trablusgarp vilâyeti (the 
                                                 
9 See KAYALI, Hasan, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the 
Ottoman Empire, Berkeley-Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1997; CAMPOS, 
Michelle, Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early 20th Century Palestine, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010. 
10 VANDEWALLE, Dirk, A History of Modern Libya [2nd ed.], Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012, p. 27. 
11 LABANCA, Nicola, La Guerra italiana per la Libia, 1911-1931, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2012, p. 11. 
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province of West Tripoli), Fizan vilâyeti (the Province of Fezzan), and Bingazi müstakil 
sancağı (the autonomous Sanjak of Benghazi). For Europeans the territory followed the 
Ottoman designations labeling the three provinces Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica, 
in reference to the seventh-century-B.C.E. Greek colony of Cyrene. Despite the division 
into separate administrative regions, Europeans and Ottomans often labeled the entire 
region Tripolitania (or Trablusgarp in Ottoman Turkish) in reference to its largest city. 
The title ‘Libya’ was introduced to the country only in 1934 when Fascist Italy 
conjoined the three provinces into one administrative unit. The introduction of this 
title, a reference to the ancient Roman province of Libya, attempted to bridge Fascist 
Italy’s empire to its Roman antecedent by associating Mussolini’s imperial ambitions 
with a glorious Roman past. Ironically, the title stuck even after independence not 
because of the absence of other names but because both the Sanusi monarchy of 1951 
and Muammar Gaddafi’s regime after 1969 hoped to dampen the centrifugal forces of 
regional divisions by adopting the Italian geographical designation. Our present 
difficulty with the proper historical designation of Libya in the Ottoman and early 
colonial period provides a glimpse at a radical transformation in Mediterranean space 
of which the Italo-Turkish War was part and parcel. The territories that became Libya 
required hardened borders and boundaries that both the Ottomans and Italians 
attempted to provide through the nationalization of the territorial gap between British 
Egypt and French Tunisia and Algeria. 
 
3. Corradini’s Nationalism, Settler Colonialism, and the End of 
Emigration 
 
Florentine novelist, theater reviewer, playwright, and journalist, Enrico Corradini’s 
ascendancy as a political commentator accelerated rapidly after the disaster of Adwa in 
1896 in which Italian forces suffered a humiliating loss at the hands of their Ethiopian 
foes precluding any further expansion of their colonies in Eritrea and Somaliland. 
Deeply troubled by what he saw as an evermore inept foreign policy, Corradini devoted 
his literary pursuits to the expounding of his own political ideals penning two 
unabashedly nationalist novels, La patria lontana and La guerra lontana and 
organizing, along with Alfredo Rocco and Luigi Federzoni, l’Associazione nazionalista 
Reimagining Mediterranean Spaces: Libya and the Italo-Turkish War, 1911-1912 
 
Diacronie. Studi di Storia Contemporanea  
 
6 
italiana in October of 1910 and its literary arm, the journal L’idea nazionale, in March 
of the following year12. 
Emerging at a time when liberal opportunist Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti was 
seeking allies to offset the growing pressure from socialists and syndicalists, Corradini’s 
nationalists swung more political weight than the meager thousands of adherents that 
filled the ranks of his association would suggest. Germany’s volition to expand its 
Weltpolitik into the Mediterranean precipitating the Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911 
pushed Giolitti into the arms of the nationalists because with France’s increasingly 
strident stance in Morocco it seemed to be Italy’s last opportunity to seize Tripolitania 
from the Ottoman Empire with the blessings of the other Great Powers. Corradini, 
having recently returned from an investigative voyage to Argentina and North Africa, 
mounted a press campaign to promote popular approval for the invasion of 
Tripolitania13. 
From a string of conferences held in May of 1911 and a series of articles relating his 
eye-witness accounts of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica first published in L’idea nazionale, 
Enrico Corradini composed his argument for intervention and occupation of Libya in 
his L’ora di Tripoli14. While he attempted to appeal to his readers’ eagerness to reclaim 
national prestige after the humiliation of Adwa, he was more concerned with 
explicating the importance of Tripolitania as the fourth shore of Italy. Responding to 
proponents of a ‘peaceful colonization’, amongst others Luigi Einaudi and Francesco 
Saverio Nitti, who saw in Italy’s immigrant communities in South America and North 
Africa an indispensable relief valve («una valvola di sfogo») for Italy’s overpopulated 
and indigent urban and rural areas, Corradini answered back that the increasing 
emigration was indicative of a near-fatal wound that threatened to sap the vital 
energies of the nation15. Between 1880 and 1915, over thirteen million Italians 
abandoned their homeland in search of a new life on different shores – an emigration 
incomparable to any other in recorded history16. Despite this immense outflow of 
people, population density between 1861 and 1911 still increased by nearly 40 percent 
from 87 to 123 persons per square kilometer17. Imperial expansion into Tripolitania 
                                                 
12 LABANCA, Nicola, Oltremare: Storia dell’espansione coloniale italiana (Overseas, History of 
Italian Colonial Expansion), Bologna, Il Mulino, 2002, p. 112. 
13 CORRADINI, Enrico, Il volere d’Italia, Napoli, Francesco Perrella, 1911, p. 143. 
14 CORRADINI, Enrico, L’ora di Tripoli, Milano, Fratelli Treves, 1911. 
15 PAGANO, Tullio, «From Diaspora to Empire: Enrico Corradini’s Nationalist Novels», in MLN, 
119, 1/2004, pp. 67-69. 
16 CHOATE, Mark, op. cit., p. 1. 
17 SEGRE, Claudio, L’Italia in Libia, Dall’eta giolittiana a Gheddafi, Milano, Feltrinelli Editore, 
1978, p. 14. 
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presented the cure for Italy’s terminal illness, its «diminutio capitis», that had rendered 
it a «nazione proletaria»18. 
For Corradini empire was not an economic venture in the traditional sense; neither 
to obtain valuable raw materials nor to uncover new export markets did he advocate 
imperialism. Empire was to be a settler-colonial endeavor to recapture the nation’s 
most valuable resource, its citizens. Having witnessed the conditions of Italian 
immigrants in Tunisia, Corradini explained that the French preferred to hire Arabs over 
the Italians for multiple reasons. «First of all, the Arab worker requires far less pay; 
secondly, he is immune to the spirit of subversion ‘à la Européenne’ and doesn’t 
strike»19. The economic structure of European colonial regimes, Corradini thus 
explained, merely served to perpetuate the proletarianization of Italians on a global 
scale. Forced to compete with Arabs for work in North African colonies, they could only 
hope for short-term contracts or wages as low as their native competitors. 
Corradini’s observation of the plight of the European immigrant laborer in the 
Mediterranean corresponds to the then contemporary Zionist labor struggles in the 
First and Second Aliyot. Yet, while the Second Aliyah’s response was a campaign for the 
‘conquest of labor’ through the collectivization of land usage, Corradini supported an 
expansion of the Italian state, a veritable ‘conquest of land’ and the establishment of 
fair labor practices under the auspices of Italian law20. In contrast to socialists, he 
explained, «Our thesis is the opposite of what the socialists support. Socialism says: 
“The politics of colonial conquest is in opposition (contraria all’utile) to the 
proletariat!” We say: “In opposition (Contraria all’utile) to the proletariat is 
emigration”»21. The reason for his objection to socialist support for emigration and 
aversion to colonial conquest were the economic needs of the Italian worker. He 
announced that even «in France, the most civilized of nations, the foreigner worker, 
that is the Italian emigrant, is subjected to a condition of inferiority to the national 
worker»22. A ‘sincere’ socialism must therefore actively support the proletariat not by 
promoting an economically injurious system of exploitation of foreign laborers but by 
encouraging imperial expansion23. 
Imperial conquest, for Corradini, thus deviates from the European ‘capitalist’ 
pattern typical to other west European empires. «Ours, on the other hand, will be a 
                                                 
18 CORRADINI, Enrico, Il volere d’Italia, cit., p. 21, 59. 
19 Ibdem, p. 42. 
20 SHAFIR, Gerson, Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914, 
Berkeley-Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1989. 
21 Ibidem, p. 21. 
22 Ibidem, p. 24. 
23 Ibidem, p. 239. 
Reimagining Mediterranean Spaces: Libya and the Italo-Turkish War, 1911-1912 
 
Diacronie. Studi di Storia Contemporanea  
 
8 
typical populist colonization, or, if you will, proletarian»24. As such, the acquisition of 
land was the motivating factor for imperial expansion and the ultimate goal of 
conquest. Given these colonial designs it is not surprising that Corradini’s discussion of 
the land of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica conforms to the observed tropes of settler 
colonial literature. Lorenzo Veracini explains that in such literature the traditional 
colonial ‘encounter’ is rendered into «a settler colonial ‘non-encounter,’ a circumstance 
fundamentally shaped by the recurring need to disavow the presence of indigenous 
‘others’»25. Or, as Gabriel Piterberg has shown, land is metaphorically ‘emptied’ before 
it is physically ‘emptied’26. 
Emptying the land of its inhabitants and justification for Italian seizure of Ottoman 
territory are interwoven in Corradini’s vehement appeal for war. For a text wholly 
devoted to an impending conflict with the Ottoman Empire, the term ‘Ottoman’ is 
conspicuously absent from his L’ora di Tripoli. Only on a couple occasions did he apply 
the word in reference to the Ottoman Empire, always reminding the reader of its 
senescence as the «moribund Ottoman Empire» (il ruinante Imperio Ottomano)27. 
Instead of conceding an Ottoman nationality or nation, he divided the inhabitants of its 
last North African possession into his own national groupings, «the native Berbers, the 
Arabs, and the Turks»28. The Turks, having supplanted the Arabs as the rulers of the 
territory, had no claim to what he termed «il principio di nazionalità» (the national 
principle). Having thus distinguished the Turks as an alien tyranny in Tripolitania, he 
asked rhetorically, «against which nationality will we advance: against that of the 
Turks, against that of the Arabs, or against that of the Berbers»29. Through a discursive 
sleight of hand Corradini thus metaphorically emptied the territory of colonial others 
by first dividing them and then championing their conquest:  
 
Therefore, the national organism fractures (si rompe) and dies (and everything dies 
in this world, nations just as individuals); therefore, the national organism dies, 
and we have nothing but to carry the corpse to the cemetery. That is to say, dead 
individuals are delivered to the cemetery; dead national peoples are subjugated (si 
sottomettono). And it is just, because they no longer possess the forces, that is the 
national organization (ordinamento), to appreciate (far valere), as much as they 
                                                 
24 Ibidem, p. 238. 
25 VERACINI, Lorenzo, «Introducing Settler Colonial Studies», in Settler Colonial Studies, 1, 
1/2011, pp. 1-12, p. 2. 
26 PITERBERG, Gabriel, «Erasures», in New Left Review, 10 4/2001, pp. 31-33. 
27 CORRADINI, Enrico, L’ora di Tripoli, cit., p. 7. 
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can appreciate, the territory upon which they live: and therefore that relationship 
of equity which first existed no longer exists between them and their territory30. 
 
Corradini thus mobilized his national principle to forcibly eject the inhabitant 
nationalities, categorizing and dismissing them as either tyrannical Turks or indigent 
natives, from the territory of Tripolitania. His ideology of nationalism uncannily 
anticipated the National Socialist quest for Lebensraum in Eastern Europe with its 
infatuation with ethnic taxonomy and its annihilation of peopled spaces in the name of 
national expansion.  
Corradini’s national ideology was also grounded in reality. While he made mention 
of Libya’s former incorporation into the Roman Empire, his goal was never to resurrect 
the glory of Rome and extend Italian territory throughout the Mediterranean31. His own 
national designs emanated from the very real circumstances of the Mediterranean. 
France, pushing in from Algeria and Tunisia, and England, already in firm control of 
Egypt, left little room for Italian expansion in the region. Tripolitania and Cyrenaica 
were the last scraps that had not yet been incorporated into a European map of the 
Mediterranean. For all his references to Libya as a ‘florid oasis’ in the desert, his 
ultimate appeal for imperial conquest came from a more sober appreciation of the 
limits of Italian expansion in the ever-shrinking spaces of a Mediterranean divided into 
national territories. Ultimately, Corradini’s nationalists provided a vision for expansion 
that would take decades to reach fruition when Mussolini reinvigorated efforts to 
Italianize Libya through increased investment in settlement. Nonetheless, the 
nationalist campaign for conquest yielded some immediate results and provided a 
further impetus for Giolitti’s government to invade. 
 
4. Seizing Tripolitania 
 
Leading the fleet charged with occupying Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were the first-
class iron dreadnoughts of the Italian Navy, Vittorio Emanuele, Regina Elena, Roma, 
and Napoli. By 2 October 1911 they were anchored off the port of Tripoli and after a 
delay of 24 hours commenced their bombardment of the city’s outlying forts. Thus the 
first shots of the Italo-Turkish War landed on the Arab port of Tripoli. 
Bowing to the demands of the war hawks in his government and the popular 
campaign lobbying for invasion, Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti had probed his 
                                                 
30 Ibidem, p. 12. 
31 Ibidem, p. 13. 
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European counterparts for their reactions to an Italian occupation of the Ottoman 
Vilâyets of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. In fact, Italian ministers had long demonstrated 
more concern about the repercussions of their North African venture on ‘the Eastern 
Question’ than on its military feasibility. In planning for the war, the Italians had 
amassed an expeditionary force of 34,000 men, 6,300 horses and mules, 1050 wagons, 
48 field guns, and 24 mountain guns, which, the Italian General Staff assumed, would 
be more than enough to overwhelm the small Ottoman garrisons in the territories 
totaling no more than 5,000 men32. The Italian strategists, believing that the rapid 
capture of a few significant ports would be sufficient to bring the Ottomans to the 
bargaining table, planned for a naval war of short duration. 
When the first troops met fierce resistance not only from the Ottoman garrisons but 
from the local population, the Italian General Staff expressed wonder. The General 
Staff attributed the fact that the population «became hostile» to «the efficacy of 
Turkish propaganda» and ascribed the Turkish successes at repulsing Italian attacks to 
«their admirable knowledge of the intricate and treacherous locality»33. 
Hoping to mollify the population, Rear Admiral Borea Ricci made a proclamation 
assuring the rights of the inhabitants of Tripoli to their property and abolishing the 
Ottoman practices of conscription and the head tax34. The proclamation asserted the 
altruistic desires of the Italian occupiers, who sought to lead the country from its 
«deplorable economic conditions» to one of general welfare, to bring Tripolitanians 
«from poverty to wealth, from misery to prosperity»35. However, the benevolent 
effusions of the navy proving ineffectual, the Italian occupiers soon resorted to more 
coercive means to ensure the passivity of the Arab population. The first of a series of 
deportations, according to a directive signed by Giolitti, sent 595 Arabs to isolation and 
imprisonment on the islands of Tremiti on 26 October 191136. 
Before the end of the first month of combat, the Italian advance had stalled just 
outside of the range of their heavy naval artillery. The Italians, better equipped and 
supplied, failed to dislodge the Ottoman armies of Turkish officers and local Arab 
recruits that laid siege to their positions. Writing for the Berliner Tageblatt, Gottlob 
                                                 
32 TITTONI, Renato, The Italo-Turkish War, Kansas City (MO), Franklin Hudson Publishing 
Company, 1914. The work is a translation and compilation of documents of the Italian General 
Staff on the conduct of the war. 
33 Ibidem, p. 26. 
34 GOGLIA, Luigi; GRASSI, Fabio, Il colonialismo italiano da Adua all’Impero, Roma-Bari, 
Laterza, 1981. The book contains a selection of official government documents and private 
accounts of Italian colons and soldiers. 
35 Ibidem, p. 161. 
36 LABANCA, Nicola (a cura di), Un nodo. Immagini e documenti sulla repressione coloniale 
italiana in Libia, Manduria, Lacaita, 2002, p. 121. 
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Adolf Krause, a German linguist in residence in Tripoli in 1911, marveled at the 
coordination of the Arab and Turkish forces in response to the Italian invasion: 
 
With such calm and confidence everything is executed! The Turkish officers proved 
themselves outstandingly in a difficult and distressing situation, the whole of 
Turkey can be proud of them. An entire flotilla of a great power arrived to occupy 
an undefended city devoid of any soldiers. And the Tripolitanian Police! How have 
these brave men, who are mostly Arabs, managed to perform their most difficult 
duty day and night without falling to sleep37? 
 
This unexpected close cooperation between the Ottoman garrison forces and the 
local population astonished European spectators and frustrated Italian plans to occupy 
the country. An analysis of this coordination of efforts between mainly Turkish officers 
and local irregulars provides a new perspective on late Ottoman history, one in which 
the Ottomans could still maintain a multiethnic empire in an age of nation-states. But 
what were the contours of this alliance between local and metropole? 
 
5. Nationalism, Territory, and an Ottoman Mission Civilisatrice 
 
Enver Bey, then a major in the Ottoman Army and a leader of the Young Turk 
Committee of Union and Progress, departed for Cyrenaica on 9 October 1911 to recruit 
Libyan irregulars to fight the Italians then ensconced in Tobruk. Lamenting to his 
friend Hans Humann, a German naval attaché to the Ottoman capital, Enver expressed 
his worries that «Tripolitania, that poor country, is lost for the moment, and who 
knows? Perhaps forever?»38. Although he saw little hope in reclaiming the territory – 
the officials in Istanbul were unaware that the Italian advances into the hinterland had 
been effectively repulsed – the sole reason for his mission «of the utmost secrecy», he 
explained, was to «perform a moral duty that the Islamic world expects from us»39. 
That Enver Bey, a central figure in the Young Turk Revolution, would justify his 
                                                 
37 SEBALD, Peter, Die italienische Kolonialeroberung von Tripolis – gesehen mit den Augen 
eines deutschen Antikolonialisten, Gottlob Adolf Krause (1850-1938), in FRANK, Sabine; 
KAMP, Martina, Libyen im 20. Jahrhundert. Zwischen Fremdherrschaft und nationaler 
Selbstbestimmung, Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1995, pp 33-65. 
38 HANİOĞLU, M. Şükrü, Kendi Mektuplarında Enver Paşa, İstanbul, Derin Yayınları 1989, p. 
79. The collection of these letters is in itself quite a story. The letters written in French and 
German to the attaché Hans Humann were only a few years brought to public attention by 
Hanioğlu, who located them amongst the papers of German journalist and publicist Ernst Jäckh 
who bequeathed them to Columbia University. 
39 Ibidem, p. 79. 
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government’s commitment to wage war with the Italians as an Islamic moral duty is 
indicative of a persisting Ottoman policy, which, with some success, legitimized its 
existence as the protector of the faithful40. 
After smuggling himself through British occupied Egypt, Enver arrived on the 
outskirts of Tobruk to take command of a growing army of Arab soldiers commanded 
by mainly Turkish officers. Within a few months he had assembled an army of 20,000 
with over 10.000 camels at his disposal for supply. He found the Sanusi Sheikhs eager 
to bring what troops they could muster to fight against the Italians. Despite the 
Sanusiyya’s (a Sufi sect with considerable influence in Cyrenaica) troubled past with 
Istanbul, Enver’s familial relations with the Sultan (he was married to Naciye Sultan, 
granddaughter of Sultan Abdülmecit and niece of the reigning Sultan Mehmed V 
Reşad) impressed them greatly: «The Arabs are ignorant to the title Enver Bey, … but 
they do respect the name of the caliph. I reign here as the son-in-law of the Sultan, and 
my country can also be proud of me from the perspective of my advantageous 
marriage»41. The Ottoman Sultan ruled also as ‘Caliph of the Faithful’, a title whose 
significance has often been ignored, and yet one that retained considerable traction 
with the obstreperous Sanusi Sheikhs42. 
Enver would later receive a letter from the head of the Sanusi order Sidi Ahmad al-
Sharif who pledged to support his cause: 
 
Hail to the vanquisher of the enemies of the fatherland and of the religion, the son-
in-law of his majesty the Sultan, the symbol of strength, whose wisdom makes him 
the greatest of the great men of the world, the leader of all virtuous monarchs, … 
the light to all Sanusi Sheikhs, both living and dead…43. 
 
Enver’s position as commander in the region of Tobruk as a Turk amongst Arabs 
who spoke different tongues was met with no disapproval or anxiety. Enver often 
employed an Islamic discourse to explicate his cause and for whom he fought: 
 
                                                 
40 DERİNGİL, Selim, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in 
the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909, London, I.B. Taurus, 1999. Deringil maintains that the 
Ottoman Empire, faced with a ‘crisis of legitimacy’, integrated Islam into its legitimating 
discourse paying acute attention to its role in the world as the protector of Islamic peoples and 
the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina. 
41 HANİOĞLU, M. Şükrü, op. cit., p. 92. 
42 SIMON, Rachel, Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism. The Ottoman Involvement in 
Libya during the War with Italy (1911-1919), Berlin, K. Schwartz, 1987. Simon contends that 
the Sanusiya, with all their misgivings about Ottoman Sunni Orthodoxy, never desisted from 
referring to the Sultan as the leader of the believers. 
43 HANİOĞLU, M. Şükrü, op. cit., p. 151. 
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And you ask me now if I would side with the Turks or with the Arabs! For me and 
for Sayyid Ahmad (the Sanusi Sheikh) nationality does not exist in Islam. Thus you 
see, that I will defend us by whatever means and will forget everything for that 
fight44. 
 
And yet, the Islamic inflection of his speech should not mask the national intentions 
he had on the territory of Cyrenaica. 
Whereas Corradini’s nationalism rendered Libya a fertile, feral land ripe for 
imperial expansion, Enver’s imperial territory was one peopled by fellow believers 
whose alliance with Ottoman officers must be exploited as an opportunity to 
Ottomanize the territory. Shortly after his arrival in Cyrenaica, Enver set about 
establishing a school for the children of his irregular soldiers. After a few months of 
instruction he could boast that «today we gave out prizes to the young pupils, it was 
their trimestral exam. Everyone was amazed with their progress in such little time»45 In 
the midst of a war and with serious logistical obstacles to overcome, Enver Bey devoted 
his time and attention to schooling the locals. He extolled his contentment at seeing his 
«150 young Bedouin pupils at the school accompanied by their parents who had 
previously feared seeing a school even from a distance» and excused his small 
handwriting in his letters to his friend as a means of preserving paper for his students46. 
The war Enver waged was not just against the Italians, but one against the 
backwardness of the empire’s peoples. It was to be a war of imperial construction 
bringing the benighted subjects of the empire the light of the Ottoman state. It was an 
operationalization of what Ussama Makdisi labels ‘Ottoman Orientalism’, a late 
nineteenth-century modernizing nationalist discourse of progress, an imperial effort to 
discipline and reform imperial subjects of a segmented empire of modern and pre-
modern spaces47. 
Enver, educated at the elite schools of the capital and a representative of the 
modern vanguard of the CUP, enacted his own mission civilisatrice amongst his 
soldiers and their families. Organizing his Bedouin irregulars into companies, he even 
arranged for them to dress the part by distributing khaki uniforms of Ottoman regulars 
to replace their «national costumes». He reported with effusive pride that the Sanusi 
Sheikhs found «that the color of the military uniform adapted very well to the color of 
                                                 
44 Ibidem, p. 188. 
45 Ibidem, p. 142. 
46 Ibidem. 
47 MAKDISI, Ussama, «Ottoman Orientalism», in The American Historical Review, 107, 
3/2002, pp. 768-796. 
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the terrain and that the troops dressed in this manner would be better protected»48. At 
which point the majority of his irregulars eagerly replaced their clothing with new 
uniforms and thus Enver «had won for the motherland a completely regular army 
which will serve her very well»49. 
Enver, an Ottomanizing missionary of progress, perceived his role as military 
commander to be one of conversion. Rather than merely charging the Italian lines, he 
had to transform the land and people of Cyrenaica from its ‘Oriental’ state – he even 
uses the term to describe the Sanusiyya – into a progressive military force. He 
expressed with pride the providential force he had acquired for his nation: 
 
I have become the master of the situation. Into my hands has fallen a power (the 
Sanusiya), a force for which the various powers of Europe, the Italians, the French, 
the English spend millions to have in their hands. Even the Khedive had tried to 
appropriate and employ them against us. And thus, this force has come to me 
without my spending a dime50. 
 
The land itself is of little use without the human force that sustains it. While 
Corradini’s territory must be acquired to recapture the rapidly depleting life force of the 
Italian nation that an accelerating emigration threatened, Enver’s national force could 
be accessed through an aggressive incursion into the same land, not to claim the 
territory but its inhabitants. Even as peace with the Italians appeared to be on the 
horizon, on August 30 Enver wrote of the opening of school facilities in the fortress of 
Guebgueb. In the same letter in which he expressed his concerns of a rebellion in 
Albania and war clouds forming over the Ottoman Balkan territories, he detailed his 
enormous efforts in educating the people of Cyrenaica. «God help us in this ordre de 
civilization. There is so much to be done in this country and that is enough to 
encourage a desire to work»51. After centuries of soldiers trampling the area the 
population and their environs have become «primitive, their homes, their habits»52. If 
it weren’t for the minimal efforts of the Sanusi, «the population […] would now be 
completely illiterate and without any religion»53. The taming of this «mountainous 
terrain» presenting «enormous difficulties» could only be achieved through a rigid 
                                                 
48 HANIOĞLU, M. Şükrü, op. cit., p. 150. 
49 Ibidem, p. 151. 
50 Ibidem, p. 152. 
51 Ibidem, p. 172. 
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education and the absorption of the people into a progressive nation54. The territory 
could only be recovered for civilization via its people. Enver’s Cyrenaica was not empty 




«Wenn wir unsere Ideale nicht verwirklichen können, dann können wir wenigstens 
unsere Wirklichkeit idealisieren». 
Attributed to a ‘German book’ Enver Bey read while stationed in Cyrenaica55. 
 
The geographic space of Libya provided a venue for idealizing the reality of two 
struggling empires. Corradini’s «nazione proletaria» and Enver’s «sick man of Europe» 
both envisaged the land of Libya as a means of recovering a wayward population. For 
Corradini an idealized Libya would be a haven for an Italian proletarian diaspora 
capable of regenerated the nation’s life force through reincorporation into an Italy with 
four shores. To create such a port of refuge meant that the territory would have to be 
emptied of its inhabitants, first discursively through the denial of an Ottoman nation-
state and second physically through occupation, conquest, and subjugation to a settler-
colonial force. For Enver, on the other hand, the territory itself was merely the staging 
area of an Ottoman mission civilisatrice that could restore Ottoman hegemony over the 
region through the educating and disciplining of a potential citizenry. 
The dialectic that emerges between these two competing nationalisms at once 
signals the repercussions of their ideological variations and the ultimate unity of their 
intentions. While it would take decades for Corradini’s designs to take root in Libya, the 
result of an emptying of its indigenous inhabitants was the death by warfare, disease, 
starvation, and thirst of half a million Libyans over the course of the Italian occupation, 
a sobering statistic considering that population figures for Libya in 1911 range from one 
to one and a half million56. The repercussions of Italian occupation reverberate even 
today as Libya’s ‘weak-state’ or ‘failed-state’ status is often attributed, at least in part, to 
the lack of institutions and state-building under the Italian settler-colonial regime57. 
Had an Ottoman Orientalist style state-building persisted, the results may have been 
far more amenable to the Libyan population. And yet, nationalist designs on Libya, 
                                                 
54 Ibidem. 
55 Ibidem, p. 168. 
56 AHMIDA, Ali, The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance, 
1830-1932, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1994, p. 1. 
57 See both AHMIDA, Ali, op. cit.; VANDEWALLE, Dirk, op. cit. 
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whether Ottoman or Italian, concur in their idealization of space – both set out to build 
on Libyan soil a definable modern national space that would separate it from similar 
spaces constructed on its flanks. The Italo-Turkish War was thus intended to complete 
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